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"[O]riginalism has become the prevailing approach to constitutional
interpretation."2
"[The Supreme Court] need[s] to accept democracy, a strong
democracy, as a Constitutional value.., or we are not going to have one."3
I. INTRODUCTION

Record numbers of Americans are renouncing their citizenship.4
California's citizens have amassed enough signatures to place on the 2016
ballot a proposal to divide California into six separate states.5 At least
thirty-four states recently called for a second constitutional convention.6
Several states have ignored or enacted laws defying the Supreme Court of
the United States' precedent.7 One politician in Texas has discussed
secession and spoken of becoming an "independent nation."8 Former
Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens has responded to this crisis by
calling for the addition of six constitutional amendments, several of which

2 R. George Wright, Originalism and the Problem of Fundamental Fairness, 91 MARQ. L. REV.
687, 688 (2008) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
3 Michael Waldman, PoliticalAccountability, Campaign Finance,and Regulatory Reform, 18 N.C.
BANKING INST. 83, 90 (2013); see also Lani Guinier, Demosprudence through Dissent, 122 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 16 (2008) ("Demosprudence through dissent attempts to understand the democracy-enhancing
potential implicit and explicit in the practice of dissents.").
4 See Paul L. Caron, Record Numbers of Citizens areRenouncing Their U.S. Citizenship, TAXPROF
BLOG (Aug. 6, 2014), http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof blog/2014/08/record-numbers-of-americans.html.
I See Zeninjor Enwemeka, Plan to Split California into Six States May Make 2016 Ballot,
BOSTON.COM (July 15, 2014, 5:05PM), http://www.boston.com/news/nation/2014/07/15/plan-splitcalifomia-into-six-states-may-make-ballot/xEFMhxj4XXjW47ODI6M7SN/storyhtml.
6 See Scott Bomboy, Unraveling Part of a New Constitution Convention Riddle, CONSTITUTION
DAILY (April 7, 2014), http://blog.constitutioncenter.org/2014/04/unraveling-part-of-a-new-constitutionconvention-riddle/.
7 See Editorial, Bad Medicine for Women, N.Y. TMES, Nov. 7, 2012, at A26, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/I 1/07/opinion/abortion-battles-in-arizona-and-ohio.html?_r=0 (discussing
attempts by the states to restrict previability abortions in contravention of Roe v. Wade).
S See Oliver Darby, Texas Politician Says State is Preparingto Become 'Independent Nation' in
Case Union 'Falls Apart,' THE BLAZE (Sept. 7, 2013 8:51 AM), http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2013/
09/07/texas-politician-says-state-is-preparing-to-become-independent-nation-in-case-union-falls-apart/.
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expand federal authority. 9 That, in a nutshell, is the problem. This Article
argues that, to remedy the imbalance in power between the federal and state
government, democracy should be more localized, not centralized.
The average size of political districts in the United States is
720,188.10 In California, the statewide population is more than thirty-seven
million, but the district size is less than 720,000.1 The Table below shows
the differences between the total and district populations of twenty-five
states:

,~

~

~

/

4,822,023

688,860

6,553,255

728,139

2,949,131

728,980

5,187,582

741,083

917,092

917,092

9,919,945

708,568

1,595,728

797,864

6,537,334

726,370

2,885,905

721,476

4,601,893

766,982

5,884,563

735,570

9,883,360

705,954

9 See Ilya Shapiro, Amending Justice Stevens: How and Why We Shouldn't Change the Constitution
Like This, FORBES (Apr. 23, 2014, 12:32 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ilyashapiro/2014/04/23/
amending-justice-stevens-how-and-why-we-shouldnt-change-the-constitution-like-this/.
10See ROYCE CROCKER, HOUSE APPORTIONMENT 2012: STATES GAINING, LOSING, AND ON THE
MARGIN, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 1, 1 (August 23, 2013), available at http://fas.org/sgp/

crs/misc/R41584.pdf.
Id. at 2.
12 Id. at 2-4.
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S

762,964
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12,763,536

709,085

4,723,723

674,818

6,456,243

717,360

2,855,287

713,822

8,185,867

744,170

If states were divided into local, or mini-democracies, citizens might
have a stronger voice in governance. If mini-democracies were comprised
of members of difference races, ethnicities, income brackets, and sexual
orientations instead of homogenous and entrenched majorities, laws might
reflect the diverse perspectives of its citizens. If wealthy citizens and
corporations could not buy access to lawmakers, inequality might lessen.
Most importantly, if the Supreme Court rejected living constitutionalism and
allowed local lawmakers to craft their own unenumerated-rights
jurisprudence, citizens might be allowed to meaningfully self-govern. Is any
of this possible? Yes. - The Constitution-and originalism--makes it
possible. Right now, however, the concept of local democracies and
participatory governance is little more than an aspiration.
This is due, in significant part, to the prevalence of living
constitutionalism and a Supreme Court that does not embrace democracy as
a constitutional value. First, as evidenced most recently in NLRB v. Noel
Canning, living constitutionalists often manipulate and sometimes disregard
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol40/iss1/2
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the Constitution's text to reach preferred outcomes. 3 The effect, no matter
how desirable the outcome, is to create a centralized, top-down, and
paternalistic form of governance. Most citizens, however, do not want a
mother and father. They want autonomy, the right to create their own
unenumerated-rights jurisprudence, and the opportunity to be a legitimate
majority. Citizens want the right to be divided, not forcibly united, on policy
issues that affect uniquely local concerns, and to meaningfully participate in
self-governance. They have neither. Instead, in today's democracy, citizens
have neither political nor democratic equality. Votes are counted, but they
have no impact. Voices are heard, but money talks.
Additionally, the Supreme Court has not embraced democracy as a
core constitutional value, or recognized each citizen's fundamental right to
meaningfully participate in governance. Indeed, the Court has removed
many issues from democratic and legislative debate, giving Congress farreaching authority to regulate purely intrastate activities, 4 and allowing
money to corrupt the electoral and political process. 5 As a result, most
citizens, particularly those of traditionally underrepresented groups, do not
have equality-or liberty-in an empowering sense. Democracy has
become a privilege for the wealthy, a mere aspiration for the middle class,
and a pipe dream for the poor. As democracy becomes more illusory and
inequality widens, the "American Dream" is becoming just that: a dream.
This Article argues that originalism can strengthen democracy
because it rejects a jurisprudence that is predicated on subjective values, and
eschews broad judicial power.' 6 In doing so, originalism preserves the
See generally NLRB. v. Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014).
See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 40-41 (1945) (holding that the government can criminalize
home-grown marijuana even where the state has made it legal); Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 12728 (1942) (Scalia, J., concurring) (holding that an individual's local and purely intrastate growth of wheat
can be taxed because the aggregate effect of this activity has an effect on interstate commerce).
15See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 588 U.S. 310, 337 (2010) (invalidating limits
on corporate campaign expenditures 30 days prior to a general election, and 60 days prior to a primary
election).
16 See Morgan Clous, A Conclusion in Search of a History to Support It, 43 TEX. TECH L. REv. 29,
35 (2010). As Professor Clous explains, even Justice Scalia recognizes that originalism is not perfect:
[O]riginalism [is] not without its warts. Its greatest defect, in my view, is the
difficulty of applying it correctly. Not that I agree with, or even take very
seriously, the intricately elaborated scholarly criticisms to the effect that (believe it
or not) words have no meaning. They have meaning enough... But what is true
is that it is often exceedingly difficult to plumb the original understanding of an
ancient text. Properly done, the task requires the consideration of an enormous
mass of material-in the case of the Constitution and its Amendments, for example,
to mention only one element, the records of the ratifying debates in all the states.
Even beyond that, it requires an evaluation of the reliability of that material-many
of the reports of the ratifying debates, for example, are thought to be quite
unreliable. And further still, it requires immersing oneself in the political and
intellectual atmosphere of the time-somehow placing out of mind knowledge that
we have which an earlier age did not, and putting on beliefs, attitudes,
philosophies, prejudices and loyalties that are not those of our day. It is, in short, a
task sometimes better suited to the historian than the lawyer.
Id. (quoting Antonin Scalia, Originalism:The LesserEvil, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 849, 856-57 (1989)).
'3
'4
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structural integrity of governance-separation of powers, decentralization,
and checks and balances-thereby facilitating bottom-up lawmaking. Of
course, originalism takes on many forms, but most originalists would agree
that moral readings of the Constitution are inherently subjective and
therefore an impermissible basis upon which to interpret the text. 7 Indeed,
originalists focus on reasonably construing the Constitution's text, not
searching for possible, but highly improbable ways to define a particular
word or phrase. Originalists consider the text's underlying purposes, but
they do not base decisions on broad notions of liberty or invent legal fictions
to ascribe meaning that the text will not support. 8 This is not to say, of
course, that originalism is perfect or to deny that some judges use
originalism to advance personal ideology. It is to say that, when applied
correctly, originalists would rather stay out of the debate rather than crash
the party. 9
Originalists also approach ambiguity with caution and often defer to
the political and democratic process where reasonable people may disagree
about constitutional meaning or the wisdom of federal or state policy. In
doing so, originalists remain committed to the Constitution's structural
vision while also safeguarding enumerated individual rights.
Thus,
originalism creates an environment where unenumerated rights can be
resolved at the state and local levels through citizen participation and
collective public deliberation. This allows citizens to realize equality,
liberty, and autonomy in an authoritative, not paternalistic, sense. 0 Put
differently, originalism respects democracy as a core constitutional value.
The biggest problem facing originalists is that, by deferring to the
states on divisive policy matters, it may allow misguided individuals, or
religious zealots like Chief Justice Roy Moore of the Supreme Court of
Alabama, to make dumb laws. 2 1 How do you fix that? It cannot be fixed by
federalizing democracy but by restructuring democracy at the state level to
17 See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF LAW 176-77,

351-55 (1990) (interpreting the Constitution with a moral philosophy risks reading subjective values into
the Constitution); see also Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEx. L. REV. 1165, 1171-74
(1993) (adopting a broader view of originalism that considers context when interpreting the
Constitution).
Is See, e.g., Brian C. Goebel, Who Decides if There is "Triumph in the Ultimate Agony?"
ConstitutionalTheory and the Emerging Right to Die with Dignity, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 827, 84345 (1996) (discussing the evolution of the substantive due process doctrine).
19 See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 705-06 (1997) (declining to find a right to
assisted suicide under the Fourteenth Amendment, and instead deferring to the states for resolution
through the democratic process).
20 See, e.g., James E. Fleming, SecuringDeliberativeAutonomy, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1, 21-22 (1995).
21 See Countrycat, AL House Passes New Abortion Restrictions after Dumbest Debate Since Last
Week, LEFT IN ALABAMA (March 5, 2014, 9:01 AM), http://www.leftinalabama.com/diary/10814/alhouse-passes-new-abortion-restrictions-afler-dumbest-debate-since-last-week
(discussing a recently
enacted law banning previability abortions and making no exceptions for rape or incest); see also Ginger
K., Against All Reason: Alabama Outlaws Sex Toys, WHY EVOLUTION IS TRUE (April 5, 2014, 8:05

AM),
toys/.

http://whyevolutionistrue.wordpress.com/2014/04/05/against-all-reason-alabama-outlaws-sex-
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minimize the likelihood that such laws will be passed and giving the
minority adequate means of legislative redress if such laws are passed. If
diverse groups of citizens had political power, politicians in Alabama might
think twice before banning sex toys, and abortion foes in Mississippi might
hesitate before taking the inane step of requiring abortion providers to have
hospital admitting privileges.22 To achieve greater equality in governance,
however, it is not enough to simply defer to the states. Democracy within
the states must be more local. Citizens deserve a voice in self-governance,
not a view from the nosebleed seats.
Part II discusses the Supreme Court's decision in Canning and
contrasts Justice Breyer's opinion, which reflects the living constitution
philosophy, with Justice Scalia's concurrence, which embraces originalism.
If there are any uncertainties that exist regarding whether originalism or
living constitutionalism is better for democracy, an analysis of Canning will
provide the answer. Part III analyzes the theoretical underpinnings of both
originalism and living constitutionalism and argues that originalism is more
consistent with principles of equality and fundamental fairness. Part IV
argues for a local, community-based democracy that allows citizens to
participate directly-and more meaningfully-in lawmaking. Ultimately, as
former Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor explains, "[t]he
challenge we face in this century is not to identify the people who deserve
the benefit of democracy and the Rule of Law, but to ensure that everyone
deserves it and its benefits."2 3
II. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD V.NOEL CANNING:
CONSTITUTIONAL AMBIGUITY, AND THE BATTLE BETWEEN LIVING
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND ORIGINALISM

Two of the most debated questions between living constitutionalism
and originalism involve the Court's approach to resolving constitutional
ambiguities, and whether, if a provision is ambiguous, the Court should
loosely interpret the Constitution to achieve more desirable policy results.2 4
Living constitutionalists argue that the Constitution is a dynamic or evolving
document and that constitutional meaning changes over time based on the
needs of contemporary societies.25 Thus, historical practices in the years
22 See Sandhya Somashekhar, Admitting-Privileges Laws Have CreatedHigh Hurdlefor Abortion
Providers to Clear, WASH. POST (Aug. 10, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.comI/national/2014/08/10/
62554324-1 d88-1 1e4-82f9-2cd6fa8da5c4 story.html.
23 Sandra Day O'Connor, Remarks at the InauguralSandra Day O'Connor Distinguished Lecture
Series, 41 TEx. TECH L. REV. 1169, 1169 (2009).
24See James E. Fleming, Living Originalism andLiving Constitutionalism as Moral Readings of the
American Constitution, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1171, 1175 (2012); see also Martin H. Redish & Matthew B.
Arnould, Judicial Review, Constitutional Interpretation, and the Democratic Dilemma: Proposing a
"Controlled Activism" Alternative, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1485, 1491 (2012); Stephen E. Sachs, The
"Unwritten Constitution" and Unwritten Law, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1797, 1802 (2013).
25 See Fleming, supra note 25, at 1183 (discussing the underlying philosophy of living
constitutionalism). See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S UNWRMrEN CONSTITUTION: THE
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following the Constitution's adoption, and a consideration of broad
constitutional values, can guide courts when interpreting a particular
provision, even if that provision is facially unambiguous.26 At its core,
living constitutionalists are pragmatic in the sense that they strive to achieve
the most desirable, or fairest, result in a particular case.
Originalism embraces the opposite view. It places primary value on
and interprets the text based on an original understanding of the words. 27 In
addition, originalists consider the original purposes underlying a particular
provision and do not give weight to the Founders' intentions and
expectations. 28 As a result, originalists view interpretation as a largely
semantic endeavor, ascribe meaning based on conventional usage, and
consider clause-specific, but not overarching, constitutional values.29
Consequently, constitutional meaning does not change because times have
changed, and the underlying purposes of a particular provision are never
interpreted in a manner that would give the text a distorted meaning.30 Put
differently, originalists are anchored, but not stuck in the past, just as they
are responsive to, but not overly influenced by, the present.
In Canning, the Court considered whether the Recess Appointments
Clause allowed the president to fill vacancies before a congressional recess
had actually started, or required that vacancies occur during a recess.3 1 The
Court's unanimous opinion masked the deep philosophical divisions among
the Justices.
A. Justice Breyer's Majority Opinion
Justice Breyer's opinion embraced the living constitutionalist view,
in that it disregarded the most natural-and probable-reading of the Recess
Appointments Clause to achieve a result that the text would arguably not
allow. The clause provides that "[t]he President shall have Power to fill up
all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting
Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session. 3 2 A
PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE By (Basic Books, 2012); LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, THE INVISIBLE

CONSTITUTION 7 (Geoffrey R. Stone, Oxford Univ. Press, 2008).
26 See Fleming, supra note 25, at 1183-84; see also Fleming, supra note 20, at 71 (arguing that
"deliberative democracy and deliberative autonomy have structural roles to play in our scheme of
deliberative self-governance, and that both are integral to our dualist constitutional democracy").
27 See Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and the Unwritten Constitution, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1935,
1941 (2013).
28 See Steven G. Calabresi, A CriticalIntroduction to the OriginalismDebate, 31 HARv. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 875, 886-97 (2008).
29 See Michael J. Phillips, The Slow Return of Economic Substantive Due Process, 49 SYRACUSE L.

REV. 917, 957 (1999) ("But it just as clearly is wrong when [the Court] use[s] judicially-concocted
doctrines like substantive due process to invalidate democratically-created laws."); George Thomas, Two
Cheersfor Eighteenth-Century Constitutionalism in the Twenty-First Century, 67 MD. L. REV. 222, 226
(2007).
10 See, e.g., Thomas, supranote 29, at 225-26.
31 NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S.Ct. 2550, 2556 (2014).
32 U.S. CoNST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.
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critical question was whether the phrase "vacancies that may happen"
referred "only to vacancies that first come into existence during a recess, or
does it also include vacancies that arise prior to a recess but continue to exist
during the recess?" 33
1. Interpreting the Plain Language
Writing for a five-member majority, Justice Breyer held that the
clause authorized the president to make appointments both during and
before the recess.3" Justice Breyer based his conclusion on the fact that "the
linguistic question here is not whether the phrase can be, but whether it must
be, read more narrowly."35 The appropriate inquiry was "whether the Clause
is ambiguous,"36 which existed if there was "at least a permissible reading of
a 'doubtful' phrase."3 7
Applying this framework, Justice Breyer acknowledged "the most
natural meaning of 'happens' as applied to a 'vacancy' (at least to a modem
ear) is that the vacancy 'happens' when it initially occurs."38 The plain
language, therefore, appeared to preclude appointments that occurred before
a recess. Justice Breyer disagreed, holding this was "not the only possible
way to use the word."3 9 The clause could also be interpreted to "mean
vacancies that may happen to be or may happen to fall during a recess, ,40
although a literal reading of the clause "permits, though it does not naturally
favor, our broader interpretation." 4 1 On this basis, Justice Breyer concluded
that the clause was ambiguous. 42 As a result, it was permissible to "go on to
consider the Clause's purpose and historical practice." '3
2. History and Practice
Justice Breyer emphasized that "in interpretingthe Clause, we put
significant weight upon historical practice"' and cited authority that
historical practices exceeding twenty years are entitled to substantial
weight. 45 Indeed, the "Court has treated practice as an important interpretive
factor even when the nature or longevity of that practice is subject to
"' Canning, 134 S.Ct. at 2556.
14 Id. at 2567.
" Id at 2568 (emphasis added).
36 id.
"7Id.(citing Okanogan, Methow, San Poelis (or San Poil), Nespelem, Colville, & Lake Indian
Tribes or Bands of Wash. v. United States, 279 U.S. 655, 690 (1929)) [hereinafter The Pocket Veto
Case]).
38 Id.at 2567.
39 Id.

40 Id.at 2554 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
41 Id. at 2567.
42

See id.
at 2568.

43 Id.

Id.at 2559.
45id.
4
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dispute, and even when that practice began after the founding era."46
After reviewing historical practice over a 200-year period, Justice
Breyer concluded that "[t]he Clause's purpose strongly supports the broader
interpretation. 47 Justice Breyer relied, for example, on a letter to President
John Adams from his Attorney General, Charles Lee, supporting this view,
and the fact that "President Adams seemed to endorse the broader view of
the Clause in writing."48 Nonetheless, Breyer acknowledged that the Court
was "not aware of any appointments he made in keeping with that view. 49
Justice Breyer also relied on a state law enacted in 1842 that
arguably authorized prerecess appointments 50 and on "[t]he tradition of
applying the Clause to pre-recess vacancies [that] dates at least to President
James Madison."'" He conceded, though, there existed no "undisputed
record of Presidents George Washington, John Adams, or Thomas Jefferson
making such an appointment." 52 Justice Breyer also cited the opinions of
various attorneys general throughout history, particularly the opinion of
Attorney General Bates, who advised President Lincoln that the issue of
prerecess appointments was "settled . . . as far . . . as a constitutional
question can be settled."53
Justice Breyer recognized, however, that there was "sporadic
disagreement with the broad interpretation."54 In 1863, for instance, the
Senate Judiciary issued a report concluding that a vacancy "must have its
inceptive point after one session has closed and before another session has
begun."5 5 That same year, the Pay Act also provided "no money shall be
paid ... as salary, to any person appointed during the recess of the Senate,
to fill a vacancy ... which ... existed while the Senate was in session. "56
Justice Breyer distinguished this negative history by noting that forty years
later, "the Senate . . . abandoned its hostility [to the broader
interpretation]."" In a 1905 senate report, Senator Tillman remarked in a
committee meeting that "[w]hatever that report may have said in 1863, I do
not think that has been the view the Senate has taken of the issue. 58
6 Id. at 2560 (emphasis added).
41 Id. at 2568.
48 Id.at 2570.

49Id.
50 Id.at 2568 (quoting H.R. Exec. Doc. No. 72, 27th Cong., 3rd Sess., at 22 (1842)) ("[W]hen any
vacancy shall take place in the office of any lieutenant colonel, it shall be the duty of the colonel of the
regiment in which such vacancy may happen to order an election to be held at the several precincts in the
battalion in which such vacancy may happen").
51 Id.at 2570.
52 Id.

" Id.
at 2571 (internal quotation marks omitted).
54 Id.

55Id.
at 2572.
56 Id.at 2614 (Scalia, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted).
51Id.
at 2572 (majority opinion).
" Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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In addition, Justice Breyer provided examples of how a strict
application of the clause would lead to undesirable consequences-a
principal justification for living constitutionalists-and thus frustrating the
clause's broader purposes.5 9
Importantly, however, Justice Breyer
acknowledged "that both interpretations carry with them some risk of
undesirable consequences,"6 but concluded that "the narrower interpretation
risks undermining constitutionally conferred powers more seriously and
more often."'" Consequently, based on a review of the historical record,
Justice Breyer concluded that "we have enough information to believe that
the Presidents since Madison have made many recess appointments filling
vacancies that initially occurred prior to a recess" ' 62 and found that the
opinions of many attorneys general agreed with this conclusion.6 3
Finally, Justice Breyer held that the clause's purposes also
supported a broader interpretation. Although presidential appointments
typically require the advice and consent of the Senate,' the Founders
drafted the clause to accommodate the president's need for the "assistance
of subordinate officers when the Senate, due to its recess, cannot confirm
them., 65 This was of particular importance in the years following the
Constitution's adoption, because of "the Senate's practice, particularly
during the Republic's early years, of meeting for a single brief session each
year. '66 As such, "[i]n light of some linguistic ambiguity, the basic purpose
of the Clause, and the historical practice we have described, we conclude
that the phrase 'all vacancies' includes vacancies that come into existence
while the Senate is in session. ,67
B. Justice Scalia's Concurrence
1. The Plain Language
In his concurrence, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Alito and Thomas, Justice Scalia wrote that "no reasonable reader would
have understood the Recess Appointments Clause to use the word 'happen'
in the majority's 'happen to be' sense, and thus to empower the President to
fill all vacancies that might exist during a recess, regardless of when they
arose."68 Indeed, "[t]he majority adds that this meaning is most natural 'to a
modem ear' . . . but it fails to show that founding-era ears heard it
" Id. at 2568-69.
60 Id.at2569.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 2571.
63 Id.
4 Id. at 2592 (Scalia, J., concurring).
6' Id. at 2568.
66 Id. at 2559.
67

Id. at 2573.

" Id. at 2606 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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differently."69 Justice Scalia stated as follows:
"Happen" meant then, as it does now, "[t]o fall out; to
chance; to come to pass." Thus, a vacancy that happened
during the Recess was most reasonably understood as one
that arose during the recess. It was, of course, possible in
certain contexts for the word "happen" to mean "happen to
be" rather than "happen to occur," as in the idiom "it so
happens." But that meaning is not at all natural when the
subject is a vacancy, a state of affairs that comes into
existence at a particular moment in time.7 °
In Justice Scalia's view, had the Founders intended the alternative
interpretation advocated by Justice Breyer, "[t]he Clause easily could have
been written to convey that meaning clearly: It could have referred to 'all
Vacancies that may exist during the Recess,' or it could have omitted the
qualifying phrase entirely and simply authorized the President to 'fill up all
Vacancies during the Recess."' 7 Likewise, a "reasonable reader might have
wondered, why would any intelligent drafter intending the majority's
reading have inserted the words 'that may happen'-words that, as the
majority admits, make the majority's desired reading awkward and
unnatural, and that must be effectively read out of the Clause to achieve that
reading?"72
Justice Scalia also explained that "the majority's reading not only
strains the Clause's language but distorts its constitutional role, which was
meant to be subordinate," 73 and "nothing more than a supplement to the
general method of advice and consent."7 4 Indeed, if "the Clause had
allowed the President to fill all pre-existing vacancies during the recess by
granting commissions that would last throughout the following session, it
would have been impossible to regard it-as the Framers plainly did-as a
mere codicil to the Constitution's principal, power-sharing scheme for
filling federal offices."75 Justice Scalia wrote as follows:
On the majority's reading, the President would have had no
need ever to seek the Senate's advice and consent for his
appointments: Whenever there was a fair prospect of the
Senate's rejecting his preferred nominee, the President
could have appointed that individual unilaterally during the
69

Id.

70 Id. (citing 1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 913 (2d ed. 1755)

(citation omitted)).
71 Id.
72 Id.at 2606-07 (Scalia, J., concurring).
3 Id.
at 2607.
74 Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted).
75 Id.
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recess, allowed the appointment to expire at the end of the
next session, renewed the appointment the following day,
76
and so on adinfinitum.
Consequently, a narrower interpretation of the Clause was consistent with
the Clause's text and underlying purpose.
2. History and Practice
Justice Scalia also found that "[e]ven if the Constitution were
wrongly thought to be ambiguous on this point, a fair recounting of the
relevant history does not support the majority's interpretation."77 For
example, "Washington's and Adams' Attorneys General read the
Constitution to restrict recess appointments to vacancies arising during the
recess, and there is no evidence that any of the first four Presidents
consciously departed from that reading.""
In addition, although Justice
Breyer's reading "was first defended by an executive official in 1823, [it]
was vehemently rejected by the Senate in 1863, and was vigorously resisted
by legislation in place from 1863 until 1940."" 9 In fact, such an
interpretation was "arguably inconsistent with legislation in place from 1940
to the present."8" In addition, Justice Scalia criticized the majority's reliance
on the executive branch's actions throughout history, stating that he could
"conceive of no sane constitutional theory under which this evidence of
'historical practice'-which is actually evidence of a long-simmering interbranch conflict-would require us to defer to the views of the Executive
81
Branch."
Ultimately, as Justice Scalia concluded, "[w]hat the majority needs
to sustain its judgment is an ambiguous text and a clear historical practice.
What it has is a clear text and an at-best-ambiguous historical practice. 82
Notwithstanding, "[t]he majority replaces the Constitution's text with a new
set of judge-made rules to govern recess appointments. 83 This was
particularly troublesome because the coordinate branches "take their cues
from this Court. We should therefore take every opportunity to affirm the
primacy of the Constitution's enduring principles over the politics of the
moment."84 Instead, the majority interpreted the Recess Appointments
Clause to embrace an "adverse-possession theory of executive power (a
characterization the majority resists but does not refute) will be cited in
Id.
Id. at 2610.
" Id.at 2616-17.
79 Id.at 2617.
80 Id.
a' Id.
82 Id.
76
7

83
84

Id.
id.
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diverse contexts, including those presently unimagined, and will have the
effect of aggrandizing the Presidency beyond its constitutional bounds and
undermining respect for the separation of powers."8 5
III. LIVING CONSTITUTIONALISM VERSUS ORIGINALISM: WHICH ONE IS
BETTER SUITED FOR DEMOCRACY?

In Canning, Justices Breyer and Scalia arrived at the same result but
through very different theories of constitutional interpretation. Both
opinions underscore the stark differences between living constitutionalism
and originalism and the impact that each theory has on ensuring a properly
functioning democratic process. To be sure, living constitutionalism and
originalism part ways on nearly every aspect of interpretation, including
whether a clause is ambiguous, how the Court should resolve ambiguity, and
whether a consideration of history and purpose adds significant value to
determining meaning.
A. When Is the Constitution's Text Ambiguous?
Few would doubt that the Founders could not possibly foresee or
provide answers to the complex legal issues that future societies would face.
The Constitution's text, which in many parts is broadly phrased, leaves to
future generations the task of resolving ambiguities in light of new and
complex problems.
Indeed, many of the Constitution's structural and individual rights
provisions are (1) broadly phrased and sometimes, but not always
ambiguous; (2) ambiguous on their face but nonetheless yield determinate
meaning; and, (3) facially unambiguous but difficult to apply in various
contexts.86 The First Amendment, for example, prohibits Congress from
enacting any law "abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble,"87 but it provides no answer on
whether a corporation has free speech rights.88 The Seventh Amendment
states that "[i]n Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, ' 89 but the
85

Id. at 2617-18.

For example, in Loving v. Virginia, the Court unanimously held that bans on interracial marriage
were unconstitutional despite arguments that interracial marriages would lead to a variety of social ills
and depart from the history and tradition of marriage. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). In
United States v. Windsor, the Court also held, despite substantial disagreement among the states, that the
government could not prohibit same-sex couples from receiving federal benefits. United States v.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013).
87 U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.").
88 See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 393 (2010).
'9 U.S. CONSt. amend. VII ("In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise
re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.").
86
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words "common law" can have different meanings. 90 Likewise, the
Thirteenth Amendment prohibits slavery and involuntary servitude, 91 but the
courts have struggled to identify the circumstances within which an
individual is, in fact, subject to involuntary servitude. 92 The Fourteenth
Amendment's language, which protects people from being "deprive[d] ...
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law," 93 appears on its face
to be unambiguous, but the Court has held that it protects substantive as well
as procedural rights. 94

Given these questions, a threshold question for living
constitutionalists and originalists is whether ambiguity actually exists. In
addition, if an ambiguity does exist, but the purposes and historical practices
relating to a particular provision can lead reasonable people to arrive at
different outcomes, the Court must decide why one outcome should be
preferred over another, or whether deference to the coordinate branches and
democratic process is more appropriate. Finally, even if the Constitution is
not ambiguous, questions arise about whether the Court should simply
interpret the words as written, or consider other factors, such as historical
practice, broader purposes, and the desirability of a particular outcome, to
reach a different outcome.
B. Living ConstitutionalismandAmbiguity
Living constitutionalism achieves arguably good results in some
cases, but that depends on each reader's perspective. The problem, as
evidenced in Canning, is how living constitutionalists get there. To begin
with, living constitutionalists reject the "conventional constitutional doctrine
that where reasonable people disagree the government can adopt one
position or the other."95 Instead, they often believe the Court can-and
should-achieve the most desirable outcomes in each case despite the
presence of reasonable disagreement about what the text means, whether
historical practice is suggestive of meaning, and whether underlying (or
overarching) values actually support a particular result. Most importantly,
living constitutionalists are willing to manipulate, and in some cases
9 See, e.g., City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 708-09 (1999).
9' U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 ("Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment
for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any
place subject to their jurisdiction.").
92 See Michael Scimone, Comment, More to Lose Than Your Chains: Realizing the Ideals of the
Thirteenth Amendment, 12 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 175, 181 (2008) ("While the term 'slavery' had a
commonly understood definition, the meaning of 'involuntary servitude' was subject to wider
interpretation; a great deal of debate in Congress concerned the scope of this term.").
" See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I ("No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.").
9 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).
95 Id. at 851.
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disregard, the text to achieve a desired outcome, although reasonable
disagreements exist about what is in fact desirable and even where
ambiguities do not in fact exist.96
That was the problem with Justice Breyer's majority opinion in
Canning, and it is also the problem with living constitutionalism. The
answers it provides serve to complicate, rather than clarify, ambiguity
because the desirability of a particular result depends largely on each
justice's personal predilections and involves a consideration of factors that
are inherently subjective. Most importantly, living constitutionalism gives
judges unrestrained power to change what the Constitution says, and in so
doing, change nature of governance.97
1. Value Judgments Are for Courts, Not Legislatures
Living constitutionalism is based primarily on non-quantifiable
value judgments because a focus on outcomes, not on process, is the culprit
that drives the jurisprudence of living constitutionalists. Admittedly,
although this is an unavoidable part of interpretation, living
constitutionalism makes value judgments a central, and sometimes
dispositive, aspect of determining meaning-even where the text is not
ambiguous. 98 For example, living constitutionalists often base a decision
upon broader principles or values, such as liberty, that are themselves
ambiguous-a historical record that is subject to differing interpretations.9 9
As such, these sources do not necessarily, or even typically, bring clarity to
an otherwise ambiguous text. Instead, they pile ambiguity atop ambiguity.
This produces muddled legal doctrines that do not effectively guide future
litigants, upset the careful balance between judicial review and democratic
governance, and create a case-by-case ad hoc approach to decision making.
Ultimately, if living constitutionalism is to have a presence in democracy, it
should be among elected officials, who require the flexibility to experiment
with new solutions as unforeseen problems arise. As discussed below, the
Court has rejected a legislatively driven living constitutionalism, yet
96 See Burt Neubome, Serving the Syllogism Machine: Reflections on Whether BrandenburgIs Now
(or Ever Was) Good Law, 44 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 41-43 (2011) (criticizing logical foundations of both
living constitutionalism and originalism).
" See Bradley P. Jacob, Back to Basics: ConstitutionalMeaning and "Tradition," 39 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 261, 274 (2007) ("U]nder the living Constitution theory, the written document does not protect
against tyranny imposed by five out of nine judges, appointed for life and, absent the extraordinary
remedy of impeachment, accountable to no one.").
" See Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 Nw. U. L. REV.
549, 592 (2009) (discussing one criticism of living constitutionalism, namely, "that it is insufficiently
legal - that it gives too much power to cultural and political influences, the national political process,
political mobilization, and partisan entrenchment, rather than reasoned development of doctrine by
courts").
9 See William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution,29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 401,

403 (2006) (explaining that "the substitution of some other set of values for those which may be derived
from the language and intent of the framers").
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welcomed living constitutionalism into its deliberations.
The problem with relying on broad constitutional values is that they
require living constitutionalists to make not one, but a series, of value
judgments. For instance, broad notions of liberty and equality depend on
independent-and subjective-decisions regarding the value of competing
policy objectives, such as whether individuals, groups, institutions, or the
process itself should benefit most from a decision. Some courts might
believe that it is more valuable to defer to the legislative branches when
reasonable people can disagree about a statute's meaning.1 °0 Other courts
might look to a statute's effect on individuals or institutions and place those
interests above the alternative views, no matter how reasonable.' 0 ' As a
result, whatever the outcome, living constitutionalists cannot claim that their
decisions are objectively more desirable as a matter of constitutional law or
policy. Furthermore, they cannot dispute that this approach gives courts an
unconstrained power to identify what result is most desirable and to rely on
overarching values that serve to make ambiguities in the text only more
ambiguous.
This approach is particularly troublesome where, as in Canning, the
text could not reasonably be construed as ambiguous. At the outset of his
majority opinion, Justice Breyer conceded "the most natural meaning of
'happens' as applied to a 'vacancy' (at least to a modem ear) is that the
vacancy 'happens' when it initially occurs."'0 2 Justice Breyer created an
ambiguity, however, by holding that ambiguity necessarily exists where "at
least a permissible reading of a 'doubtful' phrase"' 013 existed, such that a
narrower construction, even if more consistent with conventional usage,
could be avoided. To achieve this result, Justice Breyer interpreted
"happens" to mean "happens to be," which reflects the primary criticism of
living constitutionalism: it leads to a manipulation of the text."
Under this standard, nearly every clause or provision could be
considered ambiguous. Of course, as with many laws, it is certainly
possible to discern more than one meaning from a word or phrase. By their
very nature, laws use broad phrases such as "reasonable" or "substantial" to
"o See Aharon Barak, A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116

HARv. L. REV. 16, 50-51 (2002) (summarizing the nonaccountability argument, which states that "it is
inappropriate for the judge, who is not accountable to the public, to exploit constitutional vagueness and
'majestic generalities' by giving expression to his or her subjective beliefs; [i]n such circumstances, the
opinion of the legislature, which reflects the will of the majority, should receive preference").
101See Bruce Fein & Burt Neubome, The Case for Independence: Why Should We Care About
Independent and Accountable Judges, 61 OR. ST. B. BULL. 9, 11 (2001) ("[T]o believe that judges can
interpret the Constitution or laws without at times resorting to values and policy preferences is to indulge
in delusion. In hard cases, a degree of judicial 'law making' is inevitable because there is no universal
consensus about how to resolve textual ambiguities, either among judges, lawyers, professors, scholars or
politicians.").
'02 NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2567 (2014).
1 3 Id. at 2568 (citing The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 690 (1929)).
'04

See id. at 2567.
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establish a legal standard. Laws cannot be defined to a mathematical
certainty. The question should not be whether another interpretation is
possible, but whether, based on a reasonable reading of the text, the
interpretation reflects the most probable meaning. This would prevent
courts from viewing any possible disagreement as an occasion to create
ambiguity.
For example, if odds makers state that the New York Yankees have
a one-in-a-million chance of winning the World Series, most would interpret
this statement to mean that the Yankees will probably not win the World
Series. Some, guided by optimism, may interpret this to mean that the
Yankees might possibly win the World Series. Does the mere presence of
an alternative interpretation mean that ambiguity necessarily exists about
whether the Yankees will win the World Series?
As a matter of
constitutional interpretation, the answer is obviously no. If the answer was
yes, then the text would not constrain the judiciary in any meaningful way.
Put differently, the Court should not only look to whether other
interpretations are possible but also analyze whether those interpretations
are reasonable based on how the words are commonly defined and
understood. If this standard were applied in Canning, no ambiguity would
have existed, and Justice Scalia would have authored the majority opinion.
2. Constitutional Meaning and the "Smell Test"
This is not to say that the broader purposes underlying or historical
practices relating to a particular provision are never relevant or useful to
constitutional meaning. However, purpose and practice should help to
clarify the text's meaning, not give the text an interpretation that its
language will not support.
Canning underscores this point. In his majority opinion, Justice
Breyer's analysis of the historical record revealed that, during different
periods in history, members of the executive and legislative branches held
different views concerning the validity of prerecess appointments.' °5 Justice
Breyer reached his conclusion by emphasizing certain periods of history
over others, making inferences from evidence that was at best suggestive,
and giving less weight to parts of the historical record. 6 In other words,
Justice Breyer not only created a constitutional ambiguity but also based his
conclusion on a historical record that itself was ambiguous. The majority
opinion did not clarify the meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause.
Instead, it demonstrated what five members of the Court thought that it
should mean. The majority opinion, in a nutshell, reveals the problem with
"I Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2616-17

(Scalia, J., concurring).

10 Id. at 2571-72 (noting "sporadic disagreement" regarding interpretation of the Clause, but that the

Senate later "abandoned its hostility") (majority opinion).
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living constitutionalism.
What's more, relying on the historical record when a clause is not
ambiguous begs a series of questions. Why, for instance, was the opinion of
Madison's attorney general more important than the fact that Madison
himself did make prerecess appointments? Why is a letter written by an
attorney general entitled to any weight at all when a president did not follow
that advice? Why was it less important that Presidents Washington and
Jefferson also did not make prerecess appointments? Besides, even if
historical practices support an outcome that the Court deems most desirable,
should those practices take precedence over text that is unambiguous and,
thus, have the effect of creating ambiguity where none exists? Conversely,
if historical practices suggest the meaning of a particular clause, but those
practices no longer lead to desirable results, should the Court rely more on
the text even if it is ambiguous? Canning provides no answers to these
questions. That, too, is the problem.
Historical practices also thrust living constitutionalists into a
contradiction. If meaning changes over time to account for contemporary
realities, then how can past practices, principally those from different
centuries and contexts, be valuable in determining present meaning? Should
historical practice have significant value, modest value, or no value at all?
Are there any criteria for determining when historical practice is conclusive
and not merely suggestive?
Addressing another issue, living constitutionalists cannot
satisfactorily explain how the broader values or purposes underlying a
particular constitutional provision should intersect with the words. After all,
the meaning of a word or phrase is not necessarily discernable from the
values it embraces, just like a reasonable construction of the words does not
always reflect the Constitution's overarching values. This does not mean
that a particular outcome is unjust but simply that purpose itself, in some
cases, is not a reliable source by which to interpret the text. As one example,
the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on the imposition of cruel and unusual
punishment reflects the Founders' broader purpose of preventing
punishments that cause torture or gratuitous pain.1" 7 Yet neither the text nor
its purposes reasonably answer the question of whether a minor convicted of
first-degree murder can be sentenced to life without parole.'0 8 Despite these
ambiguities, and the division among lower courts and the states in Miller v.
Alabama, the Court-by a 5-4 vote-answered this question in the

07 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
' See, e.g., John Stinneford, The Original Meaningof "Unusual": The Eighth Amendment as a Bar
to Cruel Innovation, 102 Nw. U. L. REv. 1739, 1757-59 (2008) (describing Justice Scalia's interpretation
of the Eighth Amendment from an originalist's perspective).
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Ultimately, living constitutionalism's emphasis on value judgments
and legal sources that yield indeterminate answers conflates the meaning of
a provision with a search for the best outcome. This turns constitutional
interpretation into a normative, rather than linguistic, endeavor and risks
divorcing the meaning of a provision from a reasonable construction of its
words. The result in at least some cases, including Canning, is that clarity
can be turned into ambiguity.
3. Ambiguity, Individual Rights, and Democracy
Living constitutionalists encounter the most problems when
interpreting the individual rights' provisions in the Bill of Rights.
Specifically, living constitutionalists assume, but cannot prove, that the
broad values it embraces-such as liberty and privacy-are a legitimate
source of constitutional rights when they are not supported by a reasonable
construction of the text. As one case in point, although the Declaration of
Independence states that the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness are inalienable rights," it does not follow, when interpreting a
specific provision, that those values are a legitimate source by which to
resolve or, as the Court has done, to create new rights.
When the Court adopts such an approach, it undermines and
sometimes preempts the democratic process. In Griswold v. Connecticut,
the Court invalidated a law banning contraception based on a judicially
created right to privacy that has no basis whatsoever in the Fourteenth
Amendment."' Instead, the Court held that this right originated from
unwritten constitutional "penumbras, [that were] formed by emanations
from those guarantees [in the text] that help give them life and substance."' 2
Furthermore, in Roe v. Wade, the Court held that the right to privacy was
"broad enough" to encompass the right to terminate a pregnancy in the first

trimester." 3
In Planned Parenthoodof Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the
Court relied on another judicially created doctrine-substantive due
process-and a broad but undefined conception of liberty to reaffirm Roe." 4
In a manner similar to Justice Breyer's opinion in Canning, the majority
acknowledged that the right itself "cannot be found in... the precise terms
"0 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012).

"0 The DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).

" Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481-82,485-86 (1967).
112 Id. at 484.

"I Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).

114Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846-48 (1992)
(discussing the "substantive liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment" and stating that "[it is a
promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty which the government may not
enter").
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of the specific guarantees elsewhere provided in the Constitution."'1 15 In
other words, no ambiguity existed. To reach this result then, the Court held
that it was not limited by the rights in the Constitution but could instead
identify new rights based on broader notions of liberty and privacy." 16 Thus,
despite the Fourteenth Amendment's unambiguous language, which
protected against the "depriv[ation] . . . of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law,"'" the majority relied on broad principles of liberty to
create a right that even it acknowledged did not exist in the Constitution."'
Liberty is a dangerous source of constitutional law because it is a
constitutional value, and not an individual right in any of the amendments.
Furthermore, no constitutional basis exists to conclude that the courtsparticularly unelected judges-are better suited to decide how liberty should
be expressed in law or how it should intersect with other constitutional
values. In fact, when liberty is used to change-or circumvent-the text, it
vests the Court with an unprecedented amount of lawmaking power." 9
Indeed, the Court itself has long recognized the inherent problems in such a
jurisprudence:
In considering such a majestic term as "liberty" and
applying it to present circumstances, how are we to do
justice to its urgent call and its open texture-and to the
grant of interpretive discretion the latter embodies-without
injecting excessive subjectivity or unduly restricting the
States' "broad latitude in experimenting with possible
solutions to problems of vital local concern?"
The Framers did not express a clear understanding of the
term to guide us, and the now-repudiated Lochner line of
cases attests to the dangers of judicial overconfidence in
using substantive due process to advance a broad theory of
the right or the good ....By its very nature, the meaning of
liberty cannot be "reduced to any formula; its content

Id.at 848 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961)).
the Bill of Rights nor the specific practices of States at the time of the adoption of
the Fourteenth Amendment marks the outer limits of the substantive sphere of liberty which the
Fourteenth Amendment protects.").
117 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
118 Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (acknowledging that "a literal reading of the Clause might suggest that it
governs only the procedures by which a State may deprive persons of liberty").
"9 See William T. Barrante, A JurisdictionalView of the United States Constitution, 83 CONN. B.J.
217, 228 (2009) ("Jurisdictional lines are of little value unless they are respected. Judges who look to the
original meaning of a constitutional provision are closer to abiding by those lines than judges who
believe the Constitution is open-ended.").
"'

116 Id. ("Neither
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cannot be determined by reference to any code.'

120

In response to this problem, the Court's living constitutionalists
have reformulated liberty in equally undefinable phrases, including "'the
ability independently to define one's identity,' 'the individual's right to
make certain unusually important decisions that will affect his own, or his
family's, destiny.' ' 121 If these "rights" are so fundamental, then why do
they not encompass the people's right, when the Constitution is silent or
ambiguous, to determine the policies under which they will be governed?
Part of the reason that living constitutionalists embrace a robust,
outcome-driven jurisprudence relates to their belief that democracy is
22
inherently dysfunctional because majority rule leads to intolerable abuses.
They see the Court as an inherently democratic institution because it
safeguards minority rights. Of course, no one would seriously question the
Court's role in protecting the minority from tyrannical majorities. As
discussed below, though, the Court is not really protecting minority rights or
groups when it prohibits Congress from placing limits on individual and
corporate campaign contributions. Moreover, in cases such as Roper,
Casey, and Miller, where the vote was 5-4, the Court's decisions seem to be
less about protecting minority rights and more about individual judgments
on what the Constitution should allow, although reasonable minds could
disagree as to what it did allow, and that is yet another problem.
4. Outcomes Trump Process
Without fair processes, the results are not legitimate. Admittedly,
Griswold, Roe, and Casey reached desirable outcomes and reflected a
pragmatic view that such outcomes were not achievable through the
democratic or political processes in many states. Given the history of
abortion laws in states such as Alabama and Mississippi, as well as the laws
passed by these and other states after Roe, the Justices were unquestionably23
correct that, if they did not do something, nothing would be done.1
However, that is the point. The fact that the majorities in Alabama and
Mississippi decided to outlaw abortion does not mean that the minority
gained special protections simply because the policy of prohibiting all
abortions was undesirable. Of course, it would be different if the processes
"' McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3099-100 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added) (citations omitted).
121 Id. at 3101 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468
U.S. 609, 619 (1984); Fitzgeraldv. PorterMemorial Hospital,523 F.2d 716, 719 (7th Cir. 1975)).
122 Allan Ides, The American Democracy and Judicial Review, 33 ARIZ. L. REV. 1,20 (1991) ("In
Chemerinsky's words, '[t]he Constitution purposely is an antimajoritarian document reflecting a distrust
of government conducted entirely by majority rule."') (quoting ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING
THE CONSTITUTION 2 (1987)).
123 See generally Dave Jolly, Alabama Supreme Court Ruling Could End Legal Abortion in America,

GODFATHER POLITICS (April 21, 2014), http://godfatherpolitics.com/15255/alabama-supreme-courtruling-end-legal-abortion-america/.
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by which these outcomes were reached were unfair or dysfunctional. It
would also be different if the law itself violated one of the individual rights
provisions. Neither was true in Roe. What was true in Roe was that the
Court manipulated the decision-making process to arrive at a preferred
outcome.
On the other hand, the Court has made no attempt to fix inequalities
that render the democratic process dysfunctional. In fact, the Court has
done the opposite. In Citizens United v. FederalElection Commission and
McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, the Court invalidated
congressional legislation that placed limits on corporate and individual
campaign contributions.' 24 In doing so, the Court rejected the argument that
the interest of reducing favoritism and undue influence in the legislative
process justified limitations on contribution amounts.' 2 5 The Court held that
the only sufficiently compelling reason for limiting campaign contributions
is the prevention of actual or apparent quid pro quo corruption, which is
defined as "a direct exchange of an official act for money."' 126 Thus,
contributions that enhance access to and responsiveness by public officials
are perfectly acceptable, even though this is precisely what leads to political
127
and democratic inequality.
These decisions dealt democracy a severe setback. The First
Amendment was ambiguous on the question of whether corporations should
be considered people or whether money was the equivalent of speech.'2 ' As
one scholar explains, "[t]he framers seem to have had no coherent theory of
free speech and appear not to have been overly concerned with the
subject."'' 29 Furthermore, the Court's decisions prohibited the coordinate
branches from addressing obvious inequities in both the electoral and the
democratic process. Both Citizens United and McCutcheon were bad for
democracy, although the Court ironically relied on democratic principles to
130
invalidate the statutes in both cases.
Put differently, if true ambiguity in the text and historical record
does exist, the Court should consider the outcome of a particular decision,
particularly upon the federal and state processes by which laws are made.
Where living constitutionalists err, as evidenced in Canning, Roe, and
124 McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1442 (2014); Citizens United v. Fed.
Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 318, 372 (2010).
.25McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1441
126

Id.

127

See id.

121 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
129 On "Originalism" and the FirstAmendment (or Alternatively, "Please Don 't Throw Me into the
Briar Patch'), LESSIG (Oct. 15, 2013), http://www.lessig.org/2013/10/on-originalism-and-the-firstamendment-or-altematively-please-dont-throw-me-into-the-briar-patch/.
315 See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1449 ("To require one person to contribute at lower levels than
others because he wants to support more candidates or causes is to impose a special burden on broader
participation in the democratic process.").
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Casey, is that they focus on substantive outcomes, even where the
Constitution is not ambiguous. If the political and democratic process does
not provide the minority with a meaningful opportunity to participate in and
effectuate legislative change, then the minority does not have liberty or
autonomy in a meaningful sense.
To be sure, although the majority in Citizens United and
McCutcheon was more closely aligned with originalism than living
constitutionalism, 3 ' both decisions demonstrate that the Court is not overly
concerned with-and does not place a high value on-ensuring a fair and
functional democracy. 3 2 In fact, adopting this approach in campaign
finance cases would not be inconsistent with the text, history, or purposes of
the First Amendment, which the Founders emphasized was "the opportunity
for free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to
the will of the people."'33 Interpreting this ambiguity to give wealthy
individuals and corporations the right to donate millions of dollars to
candidates for public office is no different than interpreting an ambiguity to
prohibit all fifty states from authorizing the death penalty for a child
rapist, 3 4 or to require the states to provide abortion services. No matter how
desirable the result, these decisions lead to centralized, paternalistic, and
undemocratic governance.
Likewise, in Clinton v. City of New York, a majority of living
constitutionalists relied on the Presentment Clause to invalidate the Line
Item Veto Act, which attempted to reduce excessive government spending
by giving the president authority to veto specific provisions in duly-enacted
legislation.'35 Justice Scalia dissented, arguing that the Presentment Clause
was sufficiently ambiguous to justify deferring to the coordinate branches
and allowing them to experiment with legislation that would have likely
reduced overspending in Washington.' 36 Interestingly, Justice Kennedy
concurred and placed a heavy emphasis on liberty and separation of powers
principles.'37 He argued that citizens had a strong interest in ensuring that
"3 In both cases, the majority consisted of Justices Scalia, Thomas, Roberts, Kennedy, and Alito.
Although not all are considered to be originalists, particularly Justice Kennedy, they traditionally
interpret the Constitution in a manner that is more consistent with the text and its original meaning.
132 See Matthew Michael Calabria, Remembering Democracy in the Debate Over Election Reform, 58
DUKE L.J. 827, 853-55 (2009) (discussing the Supreme Court's failure to focus on democracy as an
important constitutional value).
131Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) (emphasis added).
134 See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 450-51 (2008).
"' Clinton, City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 448 (1998).
136 Id. at 464-65 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part) ("As much as the Court goes on about Art. I, § 7,
therefore, that provision does not demand the result the Court reaches.").
137 See id. at 450-51 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy stated as follows:
In recent years, perhaps, we have come to think of liberty as defined by that word
in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and as illuminated by the other
provisions of the Bill of Rights. The conception of liberty embraced by the
Framers was not so confined. They used the principles of separation of powers
and federalism to secure liberty in the fundamental political sense of the term,
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the coordinate branches operated within the power delegated to them under
the Constitution, and that each branch functioned as an effective check on
the other.' 38 Nevertheless, given that the Constitution's Presentment Clause
was ambiguous on this question, the Court seemed to make a curious
decision to focus on abstract principles of governance, rather than current
realities about the dysfunctional process. After all, would the Founders
object to allowing the government to experiment with solutions that
addressed process-based dysfunction?
Would such a result betray
originalism? No. In the face of ambiguity, deferring to members of the
coordinate branches who are well versed in the politics of lawmaking is
fundamentally democratic.
The point is that process matters. Without procedural equality--or
equal access to and participation in lawmaking-citizens lack liberty and
autonomy in a substantive sense. After all, corporation A is not more
virtuous than corporation B because it gives millions to candidates who
believe in marriage equality. The fact that corporations can give millions of
dollars to political candidates, and Congress can do nothingabout it, is the
problem. It taints the lawmaking processes with the stain of inequality, and
that precludes middle and lower-income citizens from realizing liberty in a
democratic sense.
C. Originalismand Ambiguity
Originalism, like living constitutionalism, often reaches good
outcomes. In Canning and many other cases, such as Riley v. California,
originalists and living constitutionalists arrived at the same outcome. 39
' The
critical difference, though, is how they get there. For true originalists,
process matters more than the outcome. In addition, when originalists and
living constitutionalists disagree about the outcome, the differences in both
approaches are obvious.
Contrary to the beliefs of some commentators, originalists are not
stuck in the eighteenth century. They understand that the Founders could
not anticipate every problem that might arise in the future, and they
quite in addition to the idea of freedom from intrusive governmental acts. The
idea and the promise were that when the people delegate some degree of control to
a remote central authority, one branch of government ought not possess the power
to shape their destiny without a sufficient check from the other two. In this vision,
liberty demands limits on the ability of any one branch to influence basic political
decisions.

ld.
138 Id.

139See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493-95 (2014) (all nine Justices held that warrantless
searches of an arrestee's cell phone incident to arrest violated the Fourth Amendment); NLRB v.
Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2617-18 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring) (concurring in the judgment but
criticizing "the novel framework adopted by the [majority]," and lamenting "the damage done [by the
majority opinion] to our separation of powers jurisprudence") (brackets added).
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recognize that, in many areas, the Constitution is ambiguous. Thus, when
interpreting the text, originalists do not give weight to the Founders'
expectations or intentions. 4 ° Instead, they construe the text in a manner that
is consistent with an original understanding of the words and its underlying
purposes.'14 Simply stated, originalists begin with the words and are bound
142
by "semantic intentions."'
The primary difference between originalists and living
constitutionalists involves meaning and ambiguity. When originalists
analyze the text, they do not search for every possible interpretation that the
text may support. Originalists search for the most probable interpretation by
giving the text a meaning that its words can reasonably bear, in light of what
the Founders understood those words to mean. Hence, the original meaning
may include "idiomatic meaning, but [originalism] excludes secret or
technical meanings that would not have been known to ordinary citizens in
the founding generation."' 43
This approach unites the text with its
underlying original purposes to arrive at an interpretation that fully protects,
but does not create, substantive rights. Unlike living constitutionalists,
originalists will not rely on broader purposes alone to support a construction
that, while possible, is inconsistent with common understanding and usage.
1. Value Judgments Are for Legislatures, Not Courts
Originalists place high worth on the structural integrity of
government, above all in relation to separation of powers, bottom-up
federalism, and a republican form of government.'" For originalists, the
people are better suited to decide the question of whether the Constitution is
ambiguous or silent. 145 Accordingly, originalism strives "to appropriately
146
constrain the judiciary by confining it to the interpretation of legal text"'
and eschews reasoning that is based on unwritten values or undefinable
principles. Indeed, originalism treats "as binding the judgments made by the
framers and ratifiers when adopting constitutional text. 1 47 In so doing,
originalism "is said to lead to desirable outcomes by protecting legal
commitments that reflect fundamental values,' 48 but also by avoiding the
creation of additional values it cannot be reasonably construed to contain.
Does originalism really lead to less subjectivity? In part, yes, but it
140See Lawrence Rosenthal, Originalismin Practice,87 IND. L.J. 1183, 1186-87 (2012).
141Id.at 1186.
142

Id. at 1210.

141Id. at 1183.
'" See generally Jack Landau, Some Thoughts about State Constitutional Interpretation, 115 PENN
ST. L. REv. 837 (2011). See George A. Nation III, We the People: The Consent of the Governed in the
Twenty-First Century: The People's UnalienableRight to Make Law, 4 DREXEL L. REv. 319 (2012).
145See Rosenthal, supra note 140, at 1186.
146 Id.

147 Id.

141Id.at 1186-87.
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does not preclude some subjectivity, or value judgment, based on a
consideration of contemporary problems. The difference lies in the types of
value judgments that originalists make, which differentiates their view of
meaning and purpose from living constitutionalists.
For example,
originalists reject the notion that constitutional meaning changes based on a
contemporary understanding of what the words or purposes can or should
mean.' 4 9 In Canning, Justice Breyer interpreted the Recess Appointments
Clause based upon a "permissible reading" or "possible way to use the
word," while acknowledging that it was not the most natural reading of the
clause. 5 ' Originalists reject that approach. They believe it invites judges to
interpret the text based on what they believe it could or should mean, rather
than what it was understood to mean.
Put differently, original understanding precludes judges from
relying on possible, but tenuous and imprecise, interpretations and confines
judges to an interpretation that reflects the text's most probable meaning.
As a result, the outcome is more likely to reflect the purposes underlying a
particular provision and preclude judges from distorting the text to reach
"desirable" outcomes or to create additional rights. In this way, original
understanding is less subjective; it does not allow value judgments to inform
meaning, and it does not permit courts to find ambiguities where none exist.
2. Constitutional Meaning
Originalists do not seek to change the original meaning of the
Constitution's text but instead apply that meaning to contemporary-and
changed--circumstances.
Thus, originalists do not limit the scope of
inquiry to circumstances of which the Founders were aware, or could have
foreseen, at the time of the Constitution's adoption. Instead, they apply the
original meaning and purpose of a provision to contemporary problems.
Hence, although constitutional meaning does not change, the scope of what
a particular provision protects may change, provided it is consistent with the
original meaning.
With respect to historical practice, originalists take a more cautious
approach because, like legislative history, historical practice is often
inconclusive. In some circumstances, it may help to guide a court in
discerning the original meaning and purpose of the text. However, it should
not be used to arrive at conclusions, such as the majority's opinion in
Canning, that justify an implausible interpretation of the text.
149 See, e.g., Lawrence Rosenthal, Does Due Process Have an OriginalMeaning? On Originalisn,
Due Process, ProceduralInnovation... and Parking Tickets ,60 OKLA. L. REv. 1, 5(2007) (stating that,
"by the 1990s originalists had largely acknowledged the force of these objections and embraced the view
that the Constitution should be construed in light of the generally understood meaning of its text at the
time it was adopted rather than by reference to the likely intentions of the drafters or ratifiers").
150This footnote is blank.
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As a. result, when confronted with actual constitutional ambiguity,
originalism reduces, but does not eliminate, subjectivity. Of course, given
the broad phrasing in most of the individual rights provisions, a degree of
subjectivity is unavoidable. However, originalism limits subjective value
judgments by providing a workable framework within which to connect
meaning and purpose and, thereby, create a cohesive doctrine. The Fourth
Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures,15 1 for
instance, requires courts to define the term "reasonable," which is inherently
ambiguous. To give "reasonable" its most probable meaning in this context,
originalists would consider the Founders' original understanding of what
"reasonable" meant in light of the Fourth Amendment's original purposes.
Although those purposes are not entirely clear, most agree that the Fourth
Amendment was intended to protect against the broad general warrants that
had been used in England to seize evidence. 52
A probable construction of "reasonable," therefore, would prohibit
searches that extend beyond the object of the search, or the necessities
created by unforeseen or exigent circumstances.' 53 In the Court's most
recent Fourth Amendment case, Riley v. California, the Court interpreted
reasonableness in precisely this manner and unanimously held that
warrantless searches of any arrestee's cell phone were per se
unreasonable. 54 In its opinion, the Court connected reasonableness with the
Fourth Amendment's original purpose, placing particular emphasis on the
fact that warrantless cell phone searches allowed law enforcement to
rummage through an extraordinary amount of private information that had
no relation to the reason for the arrest.' 55
Of course, this philosophy certainly involves value judgments to the
extent that it required the Justices to consider whether the Fourth
Amendment's original purpose-to prohibit general warrants-was
implicated by the search of an arrestee's modem cell phone. In Riley, the
Court had to consider whether the arrestee had a privacy interest in his cell
phone, whether the search of a cell phone was akin to (or even broader than)
the search of a home, whether law enforcement had a justifiable reason for
conducting such searches, and whether those reasons outweighed the
arrestee's privacy interest, if any.'5 6 However, these value judgments were
properly framed against the backdrop of original meaning and purpose, and
not in and of themselves sufficient grounds upon which to base the decision.
151 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.").
' See, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494 (2014).
153 See id. at 2483.
154 Id. at 2494.
92
"I Id. at 24 .
116 See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484-2490.
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This highlights a fundamental difference between originalism and
living constitutionalism. Originalists go through a three-step analysis that
involves the text itself, the original understanding of what the words meant,
and the original purposes underlying the provision. Living constitutionalists
largely disregard the second step. Instead, living constitutionalists search
for a possible construction of the words based on original or contemporary
understandings and then apply broader purposes that often extend beyond
the purposes of a particular provision. In Griswold, Roe, and Casey, for
example, the Court disregarded the Fourteenth Amendment's original
intent-to protect procedural due process-and based its decision on
broader notions of liberty and privacy to create substantive rights.
The types of value judgments that this approach engenders are
fundamentally different from the value judgments that originalists use. In
cases such as Roe, the Court was completely unanchored from the
Constitution's text and the underlying principles of the Fourteenth
Amendment itself. Furthermore, the overarching principles on which the
Court relied-liberty and privacy-are inherently ambiguous and depend on
each justice's subjective understanding of what they mean in a particular
context. The consequences of living constitutionalism, then, are that it
centralizes power in the judiciary and enables courts to decide issues that are
properly left to the democratic process.
3. Ambiguity, Individual Rights, and Democracy
A significant criticism of originalism is that it leads to draconian, or
unjust, results.' 57 Undoubtedly, originalism does result in narrower
decisions that would certainly not have recognized many of the "rights" or
doctrines that the Court has created. 5 8 The problem with this argument is
that it presupposes that a Court's role is to ensure the most just outcome in a
particular case, even where the Constitution is ambiguous, silent, or the
clause at issue does not support the result deemed by living constitutionalists
to be the most desirable. It also presupposes that unwise or "dumb" policies
should be invalidated even where the Constitution does not proscribe the
federal or state governments from adopting such policies. Furthermore,
living constitutionalists would allow courts to base decisions on broader
concepts, such as liberty, although the use of those concepts fails to
meaningfully constrain judges and results in decisions driven by normative
considerations.
This approach shows little, if any, concern for democracy as a
desirable outcome in and of itself, or of bottom-up lawmaking as a
17 See Lee J. Strang, Originalism and the Aristotelian Tradition: Virtue's Home in Originalism, 80
FORDHAM L. REv. 1997,2007 (2012).
58 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965) (recognizing a substantive right

to privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment).
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constitutional value. Ultimately, living constitutionalists' primary criticism
of originalism is based on a view of judging that is inconsistent with the
structural values that the Constitution envisions--decentralization,
federalism, and democracy as the primary source of law. Indeed, it is one
thing to protect the minority against tyrannical majorities, but it is quite
another to not protect a legitimate majority against its own right to legislate
free from the threat of a judicial veto.
Of course, living constitutionalists have attempted to justify their
approach to interpretation by arguing, among other things, that the
Constitution contains unwritten or invisible rights, and that its provisions
should be interpreted in a holistic, not clause-dependent, manner.15 9
However, these arguments seek to justify an outcome-driven, values-laden
paradigm that would allow judges to disregard any reasonable interpretation
in favor of a purpose-based jurisprudence that depends on the predilections
of individual judges.
That demonstrates why originalism is superior not only as a method
of interpretation but also as vehicle for strengthening democracy. When
originalism enforces the Constitution's written constraints, but leaves
ambiguity--or reasonable disagreements about meaning-to the democratic
process, it enables bottom-up lawmaking and gives the people, not courts,
the authority to meaningfully participate in self-governance.160 This is vital
to achieving the type of liberty and autonomy that the Founders envisioned,
namely, that "[g]ovemments are instituted among Men, deriving their just
powers from the consent of the governed.'' 16' Although an independent
judiciary is an indispensable part of a constitutional democracy, the people's
consent depends on the judicial power being exercised in a manner that
respects the constraints on its authority. Thus, if the Court changes the
Constitution into a living document that unilaterally removes an issue from
the democratic process, it is acting outside the scope of its authority, and
certainly not with the consent or will of the people. Put differently, living
constitutionalism transforms the Court from a democratic institution that
protects basic liberties to one that compromises the structural provisionsdecentralization and federalism-that prevent one branch from unilaterally
infringing on those liberties. That is precisely what the Court is doing when
it manipulates or disregards the Constitution. The Court is infringing on the
people's right to define the unenumerated rights under which they will be

'5 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARv. L. REv. 747, 792 (1999) ("If philologic
intratextualism is best at proving what a word or phrase might mean, a different brand of intratextualism
tries to show what the document as a whole is best read as meaning.").
"6 See generally Randy Barnett, The Wages of Crying Judicial Restraint, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 925 (2013).
161 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added).
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governed.1

Originalism strives to ensure a system of vertical and horizontal
federalism that protects fundamental rights but preserves the structural
integrity of the government, particularly a system of checks and balances,
decentralization, and democratic rule.
4. Process and Equality Trump Outcomes
Where both the text and its underlying purposes are ambiguous, and
reasonable people can disagree about policies that are most desirable,
originalism defers to the democratic process. Importantly, however, does
originalism inadvertently result in undemocratic decisions that fail to protect
minority rights or protect against tyrannical majorities? No, because
originalism does not allow outcomes to dictate interpretation and does not
always lead to what some might deem the best outcome. By reasonably
interpreting the Constitution's text, originalists allow rights to evolve from
the bottom-up, which gives the people a voice in democratic selfgovernance. In this way, originalism promotes the core values upon which
the people's consent-and will-are based: liberty, equality, and autonomy.
Thus, originalism recognizes that process matters more than outcomes;
procedural equality ensures that neither the government nor the courts
become a tyrannical and unaccountable supermajority. In doing so,
originalism also ensures substantive equality and a more self-determinative
form of liberty. Consequently, it would be wrong to argue that originalism
is focused on judicial restraint. Broadly speaking, originalism embraces
judicial activism-if it makes democracy work better.
Indeed, if the process by which an outcome is reached is tainted,
then the outcome itself, as it was in Roe and Casey, should not be viewed as
legitimate. It is akin to cheating on a final examination. The student who
achieves the highest grade-but obtained a copy of the questions
beforehand-certainly reached a desirable outcome. However, when the
professor discovers that the student cheated, the outcome is anything but
desirable. The question with respect to constitutional interpretation is
whether courts should be allowed to cheat for the purpose of reaching more
progressive results. Originalism would say no. Proponents of fair and
transparent democratic processes would agree. After all, unlike elected
officials, there is no penalty for cheating at the Supreme Court.
Does this mean that originalism leads to draconian results?

It

'62 See U.S. CONST. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."). Although beyond the scope of this
article, the Ninth Amendment does not give the judiciary the authority to identify those rights, but
entrusts the evolution of those rights to the democratic process. See Nelson Lund & John 0. McGinnis,
Lawrence v. Texas andJudicialHubris, 102 MICH. L. REv. 1555, 1580-81 (2004).
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depends on the values deemed most worthy of protection and the processes
viewed as essential to securing liberty and equality. The answer is certainly
yes for those who believe that:
*

The First Amendment does not protect a right to bum the
American flag, a corporation's right to free speech, or a
magazine's right to publish a parody of a religious minister;

"

The Second Amendment does not permit individuals to own
firearms;

*

The Fourth Amendment does not permit law enforcement to
take a suspect's DNA without a warrant, but does allow the
government to track and record cell phone metadata without a
warrant;

*

The Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause allows the government
to seize private property for quasi-public use;

*

The Eighth Amendment permits a court to invalidate laws
authorizing the death penalty for child rape and to categorically
prohibit the death penalty;

*

The Ninth Amendment gives courts, not citizens, the power to
identify unenumerated rights;

"

The Fourteenth Amendment includes the right to abortion,
including partial-birth abortion and assisted suicide, and
prohibits the citizens of Michigan from amending the state
constitution to prohibit race-conscious policies in higher
education;

*

The Commerce Clause authorizes regulation of purely intrastate
activity, allows the government to prohibit states from using
medical marijuana to treat cancer sufferers, and permits the
government to penalize individuals for not purchasing health
care;

*

The treaty power allows the federal government to use the
Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act to
prosecute a woman who tried to poison her husband's mistress;
and

*

The Court was correct to invalidate a New York law that limited
the number of hours a baker could work each week.

For those who believe that some or all of these results are problematic, then
living constitutionalism-not originalism--leads to draconian and unjust
results.
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Of course, an argument can be made that some of these decisions
are not consistent with, and cannot be attributed to, originalism. For
example, originalists would not necessarily conclude that corporations are
people for First Amendment purposes.1 63 In addition, as Justice Clarence
Thomas and some scholars have suggested, the Privileges and Immunities
Clause may provide a basis upon which to conclude that abortion rights are
in fact protected under the Fourteenth Amendment. 1" Currently, however,
there is little support for this view at the Supreme Court. An argument can
also be made that the Court's decisions involve a complex array of factors
that extend beyond originalism or living constitutionalism.
Certainly, some decisions cannot be classified as the product of
either originalism or living constitutionalism. This is certainly true, but each
justice's interpretive philosophy supplies the framework by which to assess
the constitutionality of a law, including the values placed on different
sources of legal authority.
Although many decisions do escape
categorization, it is usually not difficult to discern what aspects of
interpretation-the text, the historical purpose, or the broader values-the
Court emphasized in reaching its decision. Part of the reason that scholars
can often predict how the Court will rule relates to an assessment of each
justice's approach to constitutional interpretation.
Admittedly, though, in some cases, originalism will not lead to the
fairest or most progressive result. Originalists would have likely ruled
against affirmative action programs in higher education,'6 5 allowed states to
execute minors and outlaw abortion, 66 upheld bans on same-sex marriage
163 See Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990) (holding that
corporations could not use treasury money to make independent expenditures to support or oppose
candidates in elections for state offices.) The majority in Austin, which noted that "[c]orporate wealth
can unfairly influence elections[,]" included Justice Rehnquist who, although not technically an
originalist, was certainly opposed to living constitutionalism and other interpretations that sought to
ascribe meaning that the text would not support. Id.; see, e.g., Amanda D. Johnson, Originalism and
Citizens United: The Struggle of Corporate Personhood, 7 RUTGERS Bus. L.J. 187, 187-89 (2010)
(discussing the difficulties of applying originalism to corporate speech).
164 See Christian B. Corrigan, Comment, McDonald v. City of Chicago: Did Justice Thomas
Resurrect the Privileges and Immunities Clausefrom the Dead? (And did Justice Scalia Kill it Again?),
60 U. KAN. L. REv. 435, 450-51 (2001) (discussing Justice Thomas' concurrence, which held that the
Second Amendment applied to the states and suggested that the Privileges and Immunities Clause may
protect certain rights).
165 See Douglas G. Smith, Originalism and the Affirmative Action Decisions, 55 CASE W. RES. L.
REv. 1, 39 (2004) (discussing the color-blind approach that Justice Thomas, an originalist, would apply).
166 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 607-16 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 998-99 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). In dissenting in part against the majority, Justice Scalia cited former
President Abraham Lincoln's inaugural address when arguing that the Court's decision impermissibly
overreached into a matter that should have been resolved democratically: 'The candid citizen must
confess that if the policy of the Government upon vital questions affecting the whole people is to be
irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court . . . the people will have ceased to be their own
rulers, having to that extent practically resigned their Government into the hands of that eminent
tribunal."' Id. at 997 (alteration in original) (quoting Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States,
First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), reprintedin INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE
UNITED STATES, S. Doc. No. 101-10, p. 133,139 (1989)).
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and laws prohibiting sodomy, 167 and would allow school-sponsored prayer
in public schools. 16 ' However, at the same time, originalists would not
invalidate state laws that established race-based admissions programs,
eliminated the death penalty, extended marriage to same-sex couples, and
prohibited school prayer. Originalists would let the people decide, because,
on all of these questions, the Constitution is ambiguous. It is the fight (the
process) that must be fair. The resulting policy must only be constitutional.
The Court's muddled Establishment Clause doctrine, and the 5-4
decisions in many of its Fourteenth Amendment rulings, underscores this
fact. 169 However, contrary to originalism's harshest critics, it would notand does not-lead to draconian results that would enshrine racism, sexism,
70
homophobia, and all other forms of discrimination into the Constitution.
For example, originalists were members of the Court that unanimously
struck down segregation in Brown v. Board of Education and invalidated
bans on interracial marriage in Loving v. Virginia.7 ' This is not to say that
originalists are always "correct" or that originalism is perfect. The
difference is that originalism places a high value on process, restraint, rule
of law, and autonomy of citizens to make law through the democratic
means.
Ultimately, whatever result one prefers among the examples cited
above, they cannot be considered objectively wrong or unjust. In fact,
among those examples, both "liberals" and "conservatives" would likely
identify at least one case where the result is draconian or absurd, just as
liberals and conservatives are both susceptible to charges that they are
impermissibly activist. Moreover, living constitutionalism, which embraces
a robust view of the Commerce Clause and Takings Clause, is also subject
to the charge that it leads to unjust results. In other words, it depends on
one's perspective. It does not depend on law, and that is the point.
167 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 605 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). In his dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia stated
as follows:
We might have covered ourselves with honor today, by promising all sides of this
debate that it was theirs to settle and that we would respect their resolution. We
might have let the People decide. But that the majority will not do. Some will
rejoice in today's decision, and some will despair at it; that is the nature of a
controversy that matters so much to so many. But the Court has cheated both
sides, robbing the winners of an honest victory, and the losers of the peace that
comes from a fair defeat. We owed both of them better. I dissent.
Windsor, at 2711.
6' Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,445 (1962) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
169 Lisa Langendorfer, Establishinga Pattern: An Analysis of the Supreme Court's Establishment
Clause Jurisprudence,33 U. RICH. L. REV. 705, 705 (1999) ("The Establishment Clause has been greatly
litigated, with more than seventy cases decided by the United States Supreme Court since the 1940s, yet
the Court has been unable to agree for any amount of time on a standard method for determining if the
Establishment Clause has been violated.").
"0 See, e.g., Charles R. Kesler, Thinking About Originalism, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1121,
1125-26(2008).
...Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967).
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When reasonable people can disagree about the desirability of a
result, and the Constitution does not provide an answer, democracy should
be a fundamental constitutional value. Between originalism and living
constitutionalism, there can be no question about what theory strikes the
right balance between enforcing, rather than creating, fundamental rights,
and respecting, rather than undermining, democratic values. Of course,
there is one exception. Living constitutionalists might be on better footing if
an outcome-driven jurisprudence was justified on the basis that the
democratic process in a particular state could not reasonably lead to a
change in the status quo.'72 Political gerrymandering, for example, might
cause some districts to overwhelmingly favor a particular party, such that
elections are little more than a formality.'7 3 If that were the case, then living
constitutionalists should acknowledge process-based malfunction as a basis
for valuing outcomes over process.
Rarely, however, do living
constitutionalists make this argument. Furthermore, even if that were the
case, living constitutionalism would be a short-term solution. Recognizing
that the political process is broken is a reason to adopt a democracyenhancing jurisprudence, not to give wealthy individuals and corporations
the power to corrode whatever fragile foundation remains.
Why should democracy be a constitutional value? Because equality,
not liberty, is the most important human value. Without political and
procedural equality, substantive equality is more difficult to attain, and
autonomy is not fully realized. If liberty means anything, it should mean the
right to have a voice in governance and to make policy choices that result
from individual, not judicial, predilection. Currently, however, the Court's
approach to democracy is ironic. On one hand, the Court's substantiverights jurisprudence has protected, even discovered, rights that have
questionable, if not nonexistent, support from the Constitution's text. On
the other hand, the Court's process-based jurisprudence has allowed wealthy
individuals and corporations to donate millions to political candidates and
gain favorable access to elected officials. Something is terribly wrong with
this picture. The Founders did not write the Constitution to create a separate
but equal democracy, or a system of governance where the elite depend on
democracy's dysfunction to maintain that power. In addition, living
constitutionalism, although protecting minority rights in some cases, does
not strengthen the processes by which a politically powerless minority can
achieve political equality.
Why originalism and not minimalism, which argues that courts
172 See Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Democracy and Distortion,92 CORNELL L. REV. 601, 653 (2007).
171 See Gary S. Stein, An Unpublicized Scandal: New Jersey's Non-Competitive Congressional

Districts, N.J. LAWYER, Aug. 2008, at 10, 12 ("The two political parties, acting through the
constitutionally created redistricting commission, have usurped the public's function and effectively have
selected New Jersey's congressional delegation for the next decade.").
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should make decisions on the narrowest grounds possible? Although
valuable across a broad spectrum of cases, minimalism only fixes part of the
problem. It still gives courts the final word on matters involving
constitutional ambiguity. In many ways, it is like fixing a flat tire on a car
with a corroded engine. The car may look functional, but it cannot travel
anywhere. Minimalism is not the solution to the inequality that plagues
democracy. To be sure, nothing is inherently wrong with majority rule
provided that the minority is engaged in a fair fight. The path to fairness
and equality is through more decentralization and through governance at a
more local level.
IV. WITH ALL DELIBERATE SPEED: ENSURING EQUALITY AND LIBERTY
THROUGH LOCAL DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES

It may seem contradictory to argue that the Court's decisions
should, to the best extent possible, focus on repairing the democratic
process. If, as originalists would argue, the Court should not focus on
outcomes-no matter how desirable-then repairing the democratic process
cannot itself justify any outcome. That is true, except for the fact that
decisions strengthening democracy are fundamentally different from the
types of outcomes sought by living constitutionalists. They are processbased outcomes and enhance citizens' ability to meaningfully participate in
self-governance.
Furthermore, a democracy-enhancing jurisprudence would not
create new substantive rights or require the Court to manipulate or disregard
the text to achieve desired outcomes. In fact, such an approach would
reflect both judicial restraint and activism, in the sense that the Court would
confine itself to a reasonable interpretation of the text but actively enhance
the processes by which the people can participate in the deliberations that
produce law. What follows below is an introduction to the concept of a
local democracy, and the issues that this system of governance would
implicate.
A. Beyond One Person, One Vote: The Right to Meaningful Democratic
Participation
If elected officials are only accountable to a small segment of
wealthy voters, then the right to vote means nothing. Former Supreme
Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor states:
It is all too easy to confuse democracy with the mere right
to vote. But the invisible process of democracy is as
important to the Rule of Law as the actual casting of
individual votes. The process of democracy forces society
to come together and deliberate
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the importance of debate ...[and] common understanding.
And instead of sending the message that individuals are
isolated and unable to convey their message through any
means other than violence, democracy tolerates and
encourages differences.174
As Justice O'Connor explained, "[t]he challenge we face in this
century is not to identify the people who deserve the benefit of democracy
and the Rule of Law, but to ensure that everyone deserves it and its
benefits."' 7 5
Indeed, meaningful participation should be an important
constitutional value. This would require, of course, an egalitarian and
accessible lawmaking process for all citizens. In other words, it would
require that Citizens United and McCutcheon be overturned, a result that
would not require the Court to manipulate or disregard the Constitution's
text. To be sure, the First Amendment is ambiguous on the issue of whether
corporations are people and thus entitled to First Amendment rights. In
addition, the First Amendment does not answer the question of whether
Congress's authority to enact regulations is limited to the expression of
speech through money. Given these ambiguities, the Court could have
chosen an outcome that made democracy fairer and empowered citizens to
be relevant participants in the electoral process. Certainly, both living
constitutionalism and originalism can justify a decision that resolves
ambiguity in favor of a stronger democracy-a goal that originalists count
among their highest.
When the processes by which laws affecting liberty are made do not
involve collective public deliberation, however, and are disproportionately
influenced by those with wealth and undue influence, law and deprivation
themselves are less legitimate. The law does not truly reflect the will of the
people or consent of the governed. It is a law originating from an
unaccountable majority, which also exists where living constitutionalists
create rights. Neither is democratic in a real sense, but both cause
inequality.
This is not to say that citizens are entitled to equal outcomes or that
democracy should have winners and losers. Of course, complete equality
will never be possible, but when inequality is so substantial that power is
concentrated among the wealthy, then citizens are disconnected from the
very process by which the scope of their rights and liberties is decided. In
other words, the fight is not fair. Indeed, a democracy that sells access to
the highest bidder is like a magician who dazzles the audience with a daring
stunt that defies imagination. The stunt, however, is an illusion. In such a
7 O'Connor, supranote 23, at 1170.
7Id. at 1169.
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system, the wealthy live in a functional democracy, whereas middle- and
lower-income citizens reside in a dysfunctional plutocracy. The point is that
originalism has less utility if the processes to which it defers are defective.
Right now, they are defective, and part of making democracy more
egalitarian lies in localizing parts of the lawmaking process.
B. Voters as Lawmakers in a More Local-andDirect-Democracy
Democracy can be defined in many ways. Indirect forms of
democracy, such as representative government, enact laws through elected
officials.' 76 More direct forms of democracy allow citizens to initiate the
lawmaking process through ballot initiatives or amendments to the state
constitution.' 7 7 This type of direct democracy includes the following:
The most important forms of direct democracy at the state
and local level are designed to allow interested citizens (1)
to draft and initiate legislation and constitutional
amendments for the approval of qualified voters (the power
of initiative) and (2) to ask that laws adopted by state and
local legislative bodies be referred to voters for approval or
rejection (the power of popular referendum). Before an
initiative or popular referendum can be placed on a ballot
for approval or rejection, certain procedural requirements
must be satisfied, including, most important, obtaining and
filing petitions describing the action to be taken and
containing a specified number of qualified voters'
signatures. The third form of direct democracy is designed
to allow legislative bodies to refer laws or proposed
constitutional amendments to the voters for their approval
(the power of legislative referendum); this is the least
controversial form of direct democracy. Under all three
forms of direct democracy, voters decide whether to adopt
or reject the matters initiated or referred.' 78
Neither indirect nor direct forms of democracy, however, are
sufficient in themselves to ensure greater citizen access and participation in
governance. Admittedly, ballot initiatives and referendums allow citizens to
directly participate in lawmaking, but this occurs on a statewide basis, often
involving tens of millions of voters from vastly different parts of a particular
state. Furthermore, given the pervasive influence of money in politics,
176 Kevin F. Ryan, Madisonian Constitutionalismand the Challenge of Civic Education, 34 VT. B.J.
8, 10 (2008).
...See generally John Gildersleeve, Editing DirectDemocracy: Does Limiting the Subject Matter of
Ballot Initiatives Offend the FirstAmendment, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1437, 1469-70 (2007) (discussing
ballot initiatives and their role in democracy).
171 Paul F. Eckstein, The Debate Over Direct Democracy at the Arizona ConstitutionalConvention,
48 ARIZ. ATr'Y 32, 33 (2012) (internal citations omitted).
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ballot initiatives are often less about public debate and more about the
ensuing advertising frenzy that distorts more than it discloses. Thus, do
ballot initiatives truly go beyond one person, one vote, and meaningfully
involve citizens in the lawmaking process? Do ballot initiatives reflect
uniquely local policy needs that may be of particular concern in one area of
the state, but not in another? The answer to both questions is no. Ballot
initiatives and referendums are valuable tools to realize democratic change,
but they are more akin to fancy window dressing than they are to real
structural change.
The sheer size of the population in New York City, for example,
which is home to 8.4 million people,1 79 prevents citizens from having open,
forthright, and local deliberations with elected officials. Town hall meetings
and question-and-answer sessions might offer a local feel to democracy, but
most of the time, citizens are passive audience participants and relegated to
a single question to which many politicians have a prepared answer.'
In
short, democracy today lacks meaningful interactions between the people
and their representatives, which prohibits honest policy deliberations and the
inclusion of diverse perspectives.
1. Local Democracies Can Respond to Uniquely Local Policy Needs
The solution to this problem goes beyond simply reforming the
current democratic structure. It requires that democracy be more local, such
that citizens of diverse backgrounds, income groups, and viewpoints are
lawmakers, not merely voters, and that they reflect the racial, ethnic, and
socioeconomic backgrounds of those whom they represent. A local
democracy that goes beyond the state level and into towns and
municipalities, where some issues traditionally entrusted to statewide
governance are delegated to smaller communities, can fundamentally
transform lawmaking without undermining the Constitution's structural
design. On some matters of policy, states should be subdivided into
separate districts, or mini-democracies, and have the authority to enact laws
that, while limited in territorial reach, reflect the unique policy needs and
geographic and economic makeups of that district.
Think about it: Why can't abortion be lawful in New Orleans,
Louisiana, but unlawful in Lafayette? Why can't the death penalty be
lawful in Fort Wayne, Indiana, but unlawful in Bloomington? Laws that
make sense for the residents of Beverly Hills might not work for citizens
residing in South Central Los Angeles. Local intrastate democracies are
179

See

Population:

Current

Population

Estimates,

NYCPLANNING

(2014),

http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/census/popcur.shtml (last visited Mar. 4, 2015).
180 See, e.g., Alix Spiegel, How Politicians Get Away with Dodging the Questions, NPR (Oct. 3,

2012, 3:33 AM), http://www.npr.org/2012/10/03/162103368/how-politicians-get-away-with-dodgingthe-question.

Published by eCommons, 2015

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:1

based on the premise that no law-or majority-is entirely legitimate if the
voices responsible for its passage do not reflect the diverse racial, ethnic,
and socioeconomic makeup of their constituents but instead are answerable
to the those making the largest corporate expenditures. The solution,
however, is not to give the judiciary more power. It is to further
decentralize the democratic process.
The states already incorporate local democracy into lawmaking, in
areas such as education, land use, and health and welfare. 8 ' Thus, this
approach would not involve a dramatic restructuring of the state democratic
process but would entrust local communities with more decisions that affect
the rights and responsibility of its constituents. In so doing, the balance
between federal and state power would be preserved, but the power
imbalance within states would be alleviated. Majority rule would reflect the
diverse perspectives of all citizens, and the minority will have a realistic
chance to effectuate changes in the law and produce better laws for discreet
portions of the states. Currently, even at the state level, minority rights are
about as protected as an innocent person on Texas's death row and as
18 2
broken as democracy itself.
2. Local Democracies Enhance Political Equality and Participation by
Diverse Groups
As democracy gets more local, each person's voice matters more,
and the likelihood that diverse perspectives within a community will be
expressed increases. Indeed, local democracies are valuable in so far as they
unite people in common interests that transcend the boundaries of race,
socioeconomic status, and ideology. When uniquely local problems affect
everyone, political partisanship becomes secondary to purposeful legislative
solutions. And that is precisely the point. To give citizens a meaningful
voice in democracy, they should have a voice regarding laws that will
directly and uniquely affect their community's interests. That creates an
atmosphere where common interests result in shared governance-and a
democracy where the incentive is to solve, rather than politicize, a problem.
Thus, some areas over which mini-democracies
jurisdiction include the following:
0

can have

Reasonable restrictions on individual and corporate campaign
contributions;

181 See, e.g., Patricia E. Salkin, The Quiet Revolution and Federalism: Into the Future, 45 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 253, 254 (2012) (discussing the inportance of local governance in land use to ensure
that policies respond to uniquely local needs).
182 See, e.g., Innocence: New Evidence that Texas May Have Executed an Innocent Man, DEATH
PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence-new-evidence-texas-mayhave-executed-innocent-man (last visited Mar. 4, 2015).
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"

Firearm restrictions in response to local gun violence;

*

Abortion; and,

"

Penalties for certain criminal offenses.

This type of governance will allow them to participate more directly in
creating rights in areas that are not preempted by the federal government or
essential for the efficient administration of government, and upon which the
Constitution is silent or ambiguous.
Of course, how mini-democracies would be organized in each state
would depend on many factors, including the size, demographic makeup,
and populations of each state. Given that most, if not all, states already give
local governments and municipalities jurisdiction over matters such as land
use and education, the concept itself is not foreign or unworkable. The
challenge, as discussed below, will be to identify the issues that should be
entrusted to local jurisdictions but will not have a disruptive effect on state
or national governance. One proposal might be to divide states into smaller
districts in a manner similar to electoral districting, while expressly
prohibiting the type of political gerrymandering that would undermine the
entire point of localizing democracy. After all, the goal is to create minidemocracies where constituents within a district are affected by uniquely
local concerns, not to concentrate homogenous groups so that specific policy
choices irrespective of local concerns are entrenched in different areas of a
state. If'that happened, then mini-democracies would become another way
by which to concentrate power and suppress minority rule, thus undermining
the entire purpose of more localized democracy.
3. Can Local Democracies Create Certain Categories of Unenumerated
Rights Without Undermining Centralized State Democracy?
Like its federal counterpart, states must still retain a central
lawmaking body that has exclusive jurisdiction over various aspects of
economic and social policy. A state cannot, for example, have ten different
economic systems or income tax statutes, or courts of fifty different
jurisdictions that have vastly different case laws. Furthermore, local
democracy will not work if, as with electoral districting, smaller
jurisdictions are created to ensure that those in power retain influence over
the legislative process.
Thus, for local or mini-democracies to work, smaller governments
within each state must have the authority to enact laws that apply
exclusively to their jurisdiction, whose representatives reflect the geographic
and economic makeup of their diverse constituents, and whose laws cannot
be trumped by state or federal law. For that to happen, local governance
would be limited to categories of laws that (1) involve unenumerated rights;
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(2) are not in areas over which the federal government has exclusive or
primary lawmaking power, or that require full compliance by all citizens of
each state; (3) are not in areas where the state owes full faith and credit to
the laws of other states;' 83 and, (4) would not undermine or unnecessarily
complicate the efficiency by which basic services are provided.
Given these constraints, what types of laws can local democracies
have jurisdiction over without transgressing on traditional state and federal
powers? When, in fact, should the states be allowed to internally disagree
about policy choices? The answer relates to the very reasons justifying the
existence of mini-democracies: to respond to the uniquely local policy
concerns that affect citizens in distinct geographic areas and to give citizens
who are affected the right to pass remedial measures that might not succeed
statewide. The second justification relates to unenumerated rights. If
citizens are to have the liberty to determine the scope and nature of rights
not delineated in the Constitution, they should be able to do so in a manner
where they have the greatest degree of autonomy.
4. Citizens Can Be Lawmakers, Not Just Voters
If local democracies were divided in a similar manner, they would
be infinitesimal in size compared to the state as a whole. In California, for
example, the state wide population is more than thirty-seven million, but the
district size is less than 720,000.184 The average population of political
districts in the United States is 720,188.185 The smaller population would
facilitate more participatory and principled lawmaking because elected
representatives would more fully represent the racial, ethnic, and
socioeconomic diversity of their constituents.
In addition, elected
representatives would be more responsive to their constituents' policy
preferences, and laws would better reflect the constituents' diverse
perspectives, and the uniquely local issues that affect a particular district.
In this way, local democracies can facilitate greater equality in
governance, enable more legitimate majorities, and embody the will of the
people. Furthermore, wealth and name recognition would not be the nearly
insurmountable barrier to seeking elected office as it is in statewide and
national campaigns, which would facilitate greater accountability and give
broad array of diverse candidates the opportunity to seek public office. As a
result, mini-democracies would prevent incumbents from having such an
183See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § I ("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts,
Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws
prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records, and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect
thereof.");
see also Pamela K. Terry, E Pluribus Unum? The Full Faith and Credit Clause and
Meaningful Recognition of Out-of-State Adoptions, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 3093, 3097-3107 (2012)

(discussing the history and purpose of the Full Faith and Credit Clause).
18 CROCKER, supra note 10, at 2.
' Id.at 1.
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overwhelming advantage during elections, and would foster a more
substantive debate about public policy.
5. Why Originalism Fits with Democracy
Originalism is a vital component in ensuring that citizens have the
autonomy in each mini-democracy to create substantive law. Imagine, for
example, if courts took a living constitutionalist approach to assessing the
validity of locally enacted laws. Local democracies would not be permitted
to enact restrictions on the possession and use of many firearms, to require
religious corporations to comply with laws requiring them to include
contraception coverage for employees, to regulate individual and corporate
campaign expenditures, or to authorize a life-without-parole sentence for a
juvenile. Indeed, living constitutionalism would frustrate the very liberty
interests that decisions such as Casey claimed to protect and reintroduce a
paternalistic form of governance that restricts the rights of citizens to
meaningfully participate in creating unenumerated rights.
This is not to say that an originalist jurisprudence would give local
democracies carte blanche to enact laws that violate the Constitution. It is to
say, however, that laws upon which reasonable people may disagree and that
are not prohibited by a reasonable construction of the text in light of original
meaning purpose would be changeable only through the local democratic
process. In other words, a local democracy changes the decision maker but
does not alter constitutional meaning or give citizens power that they would
not otherwise have. Instead, it gives citizens the right to create and be
governed by laws that more directly reflect the will and consent of the
people through more direct and meaningful participation.
C. Can LocalDemocracies Worsen Inequality?
If local democracies were non-diverse, used to concentrate power,
and entrench majorities, then inequality would worsen. In fact, the whole
point of decentralizing power would be frustrated, as the current problems
with democracy would simply shift to a more local level. Thus, ensuring
that local democracies are diverse, and that limits are placed on individual
and corporate campaign contributions, is essential.
Some might argue that an emphasis on procedural equality will
result in substantive inequality because citizens in different districts will
have laws that vary in the degree to which they protect individual rights.
That may be true, but it is already true among the states. Some states have
death penalty, some have legalized marijuana, and seven have no income
tax.' 86 Thus, as long as those laws are within federal and state constitutional
86 See States with and Without the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty (last visited Mar. 4, 2015); Matt
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constraints and subject to reasonable disagreement regarding their efficacy,
the disparity would be no different than when citizens of one state travel to
another.
Furthermore, different intrastate laws would likely result in fairer
and more just laws-and protection for minority rights-because of their
limited reach. Indeed, one of the criticisms against the Court's use of living
constitutionalism in cases like Kennedy v. Louisiana and Roe is that the
Justices are essentially making law for an entire country without regard to
the policy and cultural differences among the states. Localizing democracy
is consistent with this view because it ensures that different policy choices
will not have such a broad impact that they negatively impact a greater
number of people. In so doing, minority rights are better protected because,
where abortion is outlawed, women choosing to have an abortion can travel
to other areas in that state where abortion services are provided.
In fact, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
recently came to the same conclusion. In two separate holdings, the Fifth
Circuit underscored the distinction between laws that have intrastate and
interstate effects. In Planned Parenthoodof Greater Tex. Surgical Health
Services v. Abbott, the Fifth Circuit upheld a state law requiring an abortion
provider to have hospital admitting privileges within thirty miles of a site
that provides abortion access. 187 In so holding, the Fifth Circuit explained
that "an increase of travel of less than 150 miles for some women is not an
undue burden under Casey."'88 This holding was based on language in
Casey that "the incidental effect of making it more difficult or more
expensive to procure an abortion" does not impose an undue burden and is
189
thus constitutional.
In Jackson Women's Health Organizationv. Currier,however, the
Fifth Circuit invalidated a state law in Mississippi that also required abortion
providers to have hospital admitting privileges because the effect would
have been to effectively close its only abortion clinic. 19 ° In so doing, the
Fifth Circuit rejected the state's argument that women could simply travel to

Femer, 2 States Now Allow Recreational Mari'uana Sales to Adults-And Our Minds Are Blown,
HUFFINGTON POST (July 8, 2014, 10:03 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/07/08/washington-

marijuana-sales n_5545187.html (last updated July 10, 2014, 4:34 PM); Dan Dzombak, These States
Have No Income Tax, (April 26, 2014), available at: http://usatoday.com/story/money/personalfinance/
2014/o4/26/these-states-have-no-income-tax/8116161/.
...Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Services v. Abbott, 748 F.3d 583, 587 (5th
Cir. 2014).
188Id.at 598.
189 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992) ("The fact
that a law which serves a valid purpose, one not designed to strike at the right itself, has the incidental
effect of making it more difficult or more expensive to procure an abortion cannot be enough to
invalidate it.") (emphasis added).
1' See Jackson Women's Health Org. v. Currier, No. 13-60599, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 14591, at
*30-31 (5th Cir. July 29, 2014).
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neighboring states where abortion was legal and accessible. 191 The Fifth
Circuit stated as follows:
Today, we follow the principle announced by the Supreme
Court nearly fifty years before the right to an abortion was
found in the penumbras of the Constitution and hold that
Mississippi may not shift its obligation to respect the
established constitutional rights of its citizens to another
state. Such a proposal would not only place an undue
burden on the exercise of the constitutional right, but would
also disregard a state's obligation under the principle of
federalism-applicable to all fifty states-to accept the
burden of the non-delegable duty of protecting the
established federal constitutional rights of its own
citizens. 92
Thus, the constitutional difference between two identical laws that
both affected a fundamental right was whether they had the de fact effect of
eliminating the right itself. Thus, local democracies that enact different laws
would not offend principles of federalism. By ensuring, for example, that
citizens still have access to abortion within a particular state, the state is not
depriving its citizens of a fundamental right or ignoring Supreme Court
precedent. Making citizens leave the state, however, is an entirely different
matter because it would allow state governments to simply legislate away
fundamental rights. Thus, the balance that local democracies would strikepromoting autonomy and participation in government but ensuring that
rights are not extinguished statewide--creates a system of majority rule
where the majority is not too powerful, and where minority is better
protected. Indeed, the rights that a majority has defeated in one district may
be fully protected in another, and the majority in one district may be the
minority in another. In this way, mini-democracies have an inherent system
of checks and balances.
V. CONCLUSION

There are reasons why some Californians want to divide the state
into six parts, why many states want a constitutional convention, and why
some are openly defying the federal judiciary. Democracy is in deep
trouble. Average citizens do not have a meaningful role in governance
because the lawmaking process is too distant from and unresponsive to the
citizens it is designed to serve. However, permanently dividing a state, or
worse seceding, is not required and certainly not advisable. Localizing
democracy within the states--creating an intrastate federalism-will help to
19!
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repair democracy without resulting in drastic territorial changes. Citizens
must recognize that the problem is not limited to overreaching by the federal
government. The problem is inequality, and it extends beyond Washington
and into the power structures and political juggernauts that dominate in
many states.
Indeed, a large part of the problem results from the inefficiency and
unresponsiveness of centralized state governance, which in some places is
accessible to only those who can buy a seat at the table or who are
connected to the political elite. The sheer size of many states has also made
it more akin to an impersonal bureaucracy, not a democracy. California has
a population of over thirty-seven million, Texas has a population of over
twenty-five million, and New York has a population size of nearly twenty
million.'93 In fact, thirty-six of fifty states have a population of a least two
million people.' 94
Furthermore, when driving through New York, for example, it
becomes apparent that some parts of the state bear no physical or
demographic relation to others. New York City and Ithaca look more like
different countries than different parts of the same state. That, of course, is
a good thing because it reflects New York's diversity and rich culture.
Democracy should do the same thing by meaningfully involving diverse
groups and cultures in the lawmaking process.
The Founders anticipated that local democracy would protect citizen
autonomy but did not anticipate that some local democracies would govern
populations that were ten times larger than the entire United States'
population in the Founders' era. Some might say that this sounds like an
argument for living constitutionalism. In a way, it is-the federal and state
legislatures should be permitted to experiment with solutions that would
make the government more accessible to its people. More importantly, the
Supreme Court should not stop them from doing so. By localizing
democracy in some areas, states can respond effectively to the federalization
of democracy and restore lawmaking power to its citizens in a principled
way. Furthermore, by adopting an originalist jurisprudence, the Court can
assume an active role in promoting democracy and self-governance. After
all, if, as some living constitutionalists say, the inalienable right to life,
liberty, and happiness implies a fundamental right to privacy, sexual
freedom, and abortion, then surely it also implies a right to have one's voice
in democracy rise above a whisper.

1' See States Ranked by Size and Population,IPL2, http://www.ipi.org/div/stateknow/popchart.html
(last visited Mar. 4, 2015).
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